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Inducing Breach of Contract: 
A Comparison of the Laws of the United States, 
France, The Federal Republic of Germany 
and Switzerland 
by Peter H. Eulau· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, inducing breach of contract has become the topic of increas-
ing legal comment not only in the United States but also in Europe. It is 
remarkable that in Germany, in particular, several theories were created with 
the goal of changing a more or less constant line of judicial opinion. It was not 
the decisions themselves so much as the reasoning behind them which became 
the subject of critical consideration. In France and the United States gener-
ally, no such tendencies can be found. Neither the reasoning of the courts nor 
the opinions of the different commentators have generally tried to change rules 
and concepts which have been followed for many years. Only a small number 
of decisions on inducing breach of contract has been handed down in 
Switzerland, perhaps due to potential plaintiffs' fears of losing their cases as 
the Swiss courts more cautiously define a tort with regard to the inducer's act-
ing than do the courts in the United States, in France, or, in some respects, in 
Germany. Moreover, the losing party must bear both its own and its oppo-
nent's costs as well as the court costs. The number of Swiss publications on 
this subject is also very small. 
France, Germany and Switzerland offer different approaches and solutions 
to the problem of inducing breach of contract. The American solution has 
·Advokat und Notar, Basel (Switzerland), Lic.iur. (1970), Dr. iur. (1976), U. of Basel; 
Graduate Program (1977), Harvard Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge and to thank 
the Swiss National Science Foundation for generously sponsoring his research fellowship at Har-
vard Law School in the course of which this work was written. He also acknowledges his in-
debtedness to his friend Donald M. Wolf, M.B.A.,J.D., for the invaluable assistance in revising 
this article. 
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something in common with that of France, though these two countries have 
completely different legal systems. It is the author's intention to present not 
only the various solutions, although a description of the solutions in each of 
those four countries will be necessary, but also to discuss the underlying legal 
concepts which lead to the different solutions. 
In a general sense, liability of the inducer for damages caused to one con-
tractual party (hereinafter referred to as the Creditor) is the rule in the com-
mon law countries and in France; in Germany and Switzerland, however, 
liability is dependent upon various specific conditions such as the manner of 
the inducement or the nature of the violated contract itself. 
This discussion is limited to problems connected with inducing breach of 
contractual obligations in the intrinsic sense. Cases of alienation of a spouse's 
affection, for example, or of inducing breach of a marriage settlement will be 
excluded from the discussion. 
This article considers cases where a person (hereinafter referred to as the 
Debtor) breaches a contract at the instigation of a third party, not those where 
a third person interferes in another way by doing some act which makes per-
formance more burdensome or impossible or renders it of less value to the 
Credit?r. For example, the cases of an assignor who accepts payment from his 
debtor who did not know of the assignment and who is, therefore, acting bona 
fide, or of an unauthorized holder of bearer instruments who cashes the in-
struments will not be discussed here, nor will cases where a third person affects 
an owed object either by destroying, damaging, withholding or concealing it, 
or where a third person commits a tort against another person by violating his 
personal integrity so that the other person is unable to accomplish the condi-
tions of the contract. Also excluded are cases where acts of third persons cause 
only a conflict of claims, rather than a breach of contract.! 
To determine if and when a third person, a nonparty to an existing contrac-
tual relationship, can be sued by the Creditor of the contract, it is necessary to 
begin by recognizing one of the most fundamental principles of the law of con-
tracts, privity of contract, under which only one party can demand from its oppo-
nent the accomplishment of its claim and, similarly, only the opponent can be 
forced to fulfill its duty. The interest of one party is thereby directed to the in-
tegrity of its contractual relationship with the other, 2 and may involve interests 
in commercial expectancies. On the other hand, one must remember that the 
third person has an interest in keeping his own freedom of individual action, a 
part of which is freedom of contract in the sense of freely choosing contractual 
1. There is a conflict of claims when the realization of one of several concurring claims would 
vitiate the others. See N. ZACHMANN, DIE KOLLISION VON FORDERUNGRECHTEN 1 (1976) (and 
cases cited therein). 
2. "It is of the highest social importance to preserve the integrity of contractual relations." 1 
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 490 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]. 
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partners as well as forming the contract and its contents. The extent to which 
the law protects each interest vis-a-vis the other is the result of a weighing and 
balancing process.s Thereupon may depend, not solely but decisively, the 
legitimacy of holding the third person liable. In any case, the Creditor will 
often find advantage in suing the third person, the outsider, who induced the 
Debtor to breach the contract; the Debtor might not be found or might not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, or the inducer might be financially 
more able to pay damages than the breaching party.· Often only the inducer is 
able to give restitution to the victim of the breach. Moreover, even if an action 
against the Debtor is available to the Creditor, the inducer would still have no 
defense insofar as both he and the Debtor are wrongdoers; each would be 
liable for the loss.5 
II. HISTORICAL SURVEY 
The roots of precedents on inducing breach of contract, a special category of 
interference with contractual relations, reach back to the Roman law concepts 
of the manus and patria potestas. These consisted of the husband and father's 
right of "community of life": when the wife was withheld from the husband 
by a third person, the husband had the redress of the interdictum de weoTe exhi-
benda ac ducenda, even where the third person was the wife's father.6 A similar 
redress was available to the paterfamilias when a third person took possession of 
his child. 7 
3. See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 687 (1922-1923) [hereinafter 
cited as Sayre]: 
The law can undertake to restrain everyone from committing acts of violence without 
seriously impairing the general freedom of action; it cannot thus undertake to restrain 
everyone from committing otherwise lawful acts which may result in causing people to 
break their contract, without sacrificing that very freedom of individual action which 
the common law exists largely to secure. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 766, Comment c, at 39 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Draft 14]. 
4. See H. VYGEN, DIE VERLEITUNG ZUM VERTRAGSBRUCH 1M ANGLO-AMERlKANISCHEN UND 
DEUTSCHEN RECHT (EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG) 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
VYGEN]. 
5. Phillips & Benjamin Co. v. Ratner, 206 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1953); Horn v. Seth, 201 Md. 
589,95 A.2d 312 (1953); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443,173 N.E. 674 (1930). Some older 
cases have held to the contrary: Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 57 (1891); Glencoe 
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Comm'n Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 93 (1897); Swain v. 
Johnson, 151 N.C. 93, 65 S.E. 619 (1909). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
948 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment u., at 
49. This principle is also recognized in Switzerland, France and Germany. 
6. DIGEST 43.30.2 (Hermogenianus): "Immo magis dI uxore exhibenda ac ducenda pater, etiam qui 
jiliam in potestate habet, a marita recte convenitur. " 
7. Filii vindicatio, in later times: interdictum dlliberis exhibendis or interdictum dlliberis ducendis. The 
instances of the Roman law cited by Sayre, supra note 3, and by 1 HARPER&JAMES,supra note 2, 
at 491, should be considered the historical background of cases of interference with existing rela-
tions in general, rather than specifically those of inducing breach of contract. 
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Another source can be found in premedieval German law. When the bride's 
clan did not agree to the marriage, the groom could make the bride his wife by 
"kidnapping" her (with her consent, of course). With the marriage, the wife 
lost the memb.ership of her clan and, importantly, the husband had to pay an 
atonement to that clan. 8 
These ancient conceptions of protection of the "family's head" - and, 
thus, in some measure of the family itself - against interferences by outsiders 
found its expression in statutes in England as well as in some Continental 
countries, but it was no longer the husband or father who was to be protected. 
The protection of the employer or master against enticement of his servant or 
laborer carne to be the subject of the doctrine. In 1349, as a consequence of the 
death of laborers in the Great Plague, the Ordinance of Labourers was 
enacted. 9 A system of compulsory labor was introduced under which every 
able-bodied man and woman under sixty years "not living in merchandize, 
nor exercising any craft, nor having of his own whereof he may live, nor 
proper land" was compelled to serve "him which so shall him require" at the 
wages as fixed by law at the pre-Plague level. 10 To prevent servants from run-
ning away, the Ordinance provided in Chapter Two: 
If any reaper, mover, or other workman or servant, of what estate or 
condition that he be, retained in any man's service, do depart from 
the said service without reasonable cause or license, before the term 
agreed, he shall have pain of imprisonment. And that none under 
the same pain presume to receive or to retain any such in his 
service. II 
Thus, this provision addressed two different parties: the reaper, mover or 
other workman or servant as the person engaged in a performance, and the 
"third person," the outsider, who presumed to receive or retain any such person 
who was already bound to another. Only the second category is important to 
this article. It is noteworthy that the statute forbade the exploitation of the ser-
vant's breach of contract whether combined with an inducement or not. 12 The 
statutory action was action of trespass, similar to the older action for physical 
violence against servants. Later, the two actions were absorbed in the action 
on the case. 13 
8. See H. PLANITZ & K.A. ECKHARDT, DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 54 (3d ed. 1971). The 
wife's clan could also use its right of private warfare. See R. SCHROEDER & E.V. KUENSSBERG, 
LEHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE 74 n.57 (7th ed. 1932). Atonement is not to be 
mistaken for the price which the husband had to pay for buying his wife in the so-called contrac-
tual marriage, the regular form of marriage. See id. at 75, 75 n. 60. 
9. 23 Edw. 3. 
10. See Sayre, supra note 3, at 665. 
11. See note 9 supra, c.2. 
12. There are somewhat similar provisions in labor statutes at the present time without, 
however, punishment. Cj GEWERBEORDNUNG FUER DAS DEUTSCHE REICH (The Ordinance ofthe 
German Empire on Trade) [GeWO] § 125; C. TRAV. (French Labor Code) art. L. 122-15 (Fr.). 
13. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 928-29; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 491; Sayre, supra 
note 3. 
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The ancient German law also made enticement of servants to quit their 
employment a crime. The servant as well as the enticer had to pay the 
authorities a heavy fine. Moreover, an important difference from the English 
Ordinance of Labourers was that the principal could file a suit for compensa-
tion against the enticer.a These rules were later adopted by the so-called 
Common German Civil Law. 15 Statutes on the European Continent pro-
hibited not only the enticement of servants but included also provisions con-
cerning a third person's liability for inducing a seller to breach his contract 
with a buyer and to sell the goods to the third person (the second buyer). For 
example, under Title VIII of the Ordinance of the City Court of Basle (Basler 
Stadtgerichtsordnung) of 1719, the first buyer had a claim against the inducer, if 
the latter acted in bad faith, for surrender of the goods. In addition, the in-
ducer was punished for his act. 16 
The Napoleonic Code had a similar provision: 
Si la chose qu'on s'est oblige de donner ou de livrer it deux person-
nes successivement, est purement mobiliere, celie des deux qui en a 
ete mise en possession reelle est preferee et en demeure proprietaire, 
encore que son titre soit posterieur en date, pourvu toutefois que la 
possession soit de bonne foiY 
Neither the Napoleonic Code nor the Prussian Civil Code (the so-called Prus-
sian Common Law) limited the Creditor's protection against inducement to 
breach a contract to the cases mentioned above. Since both codes protected all 
assets, including real and personal property as well as contractual rights, by 
ordaining compensation for every illicit and culpable detriment, 18 the 
Creditor had a claim against a third person in any case of inducing breach of 
contract. 19 Thus, by the end of the 18th Century, development in civil law 
countries of liability for inducing breach of contract was ahead of that in com-
mon law ones. 
A caesura and a start of a new development was the case of Lumley v. Gye, 20 
14. SeeVYGEN,supra note 4, at 71; D. REHBEIN, DIEVERLETZUNGVONFORDERUNGSRECHTEN 
DURCH DRITTE 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as REHBEIN); Fischer, Die VeTletzung des Glaeubigerrechts 
als unerlaubte Handlung, in 12 ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM PRIVATRECHT UND CIVILPROZESS DES DEUT-
SCHEN REICHES 38 (O.C. Fischer ed. 1905). 
15. /d. 
16. Other examples can be found inJ. BRUNNEMANN. COMMENTARIUS IN CODlCEMJUSTlN-
IANEUM(1608-1672), further in (1756) Code Maximilaneus bavaricus civilus, Statute IV, 4 § 9; 
if. ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FUER DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAA TEN (The Prussian Civil Code) [ALR) 
I 10 §S 23, 25. 
17. "If a thing which a person has undertaken to give or to deliver to two persons consecutive-
ly is purely personal property, the one of the two who has been placed in actual possession is 
preferred and remains the owner, even should his title be subseql\ent as to date, provided 
however he possesses in good faith." CODE NAPOLEON art. 1141 (H. Cachard trans.). 
18. See id. arts. 1382 & 1383 (currently the French Civil Code), and ALR I 6 U 10 et seq. 
19. See VYGEN, supra note 4, at 71 et seq. 
20. (1853) 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749. 
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decided in 1853. Miss Johanna Wagner, an opera singer, had contracted with 
the plaintiff to perform in his theatre, exclusively, for a certain time. The 
defendant, "knowing the premises, and maliciously 
intending to injure plaintiff as lessee and manager of the theatre, enticed and 
procured" Johanna Wagner to refuse to carry out her contract. Although an 
opera singer could not be considered a "workman or servant" within the 
meaning of the Ordinance of Labourers, the court held that the principle of 
the statute should be extended to this case, and that it was a tort to induce her 
to break the engagement. 21 
For a time it was not clear whether the rule stated by a discordant court 
would be generally accepted. Finally, about thirty years later, the English 
Court of Appeals declared that the doctrine was to be adopted as an un-
disputed part of English law. 22 In 1893, the principle of Lumley v. Gye was ex-
tended to cases of inducing breach of contract other than those for personal 
service. 23 In Quinn v. Leathem,2. Lord MacNaughten spelled out the general 
rule that "it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations 
recognised by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference. "2' 
The legal development in England has been significant for the legal 
development in the United States as well as in the other common law coun-
tries. The rule stated in the leading case of Lumley v. Gye was generally ac-
21. Justice Erie stated: 
[T]he answer appears to me to be, that the class of cases referred to rests upon the prin-
ciple that the procurement of the violation of the right is a cause of action, and that, 
when this principle is applied to a violation of a right arising upon a contract of hiring, 
the nature of the service contracted for is immaterial. It is clear that the procurement of 
the violation of a right is a cause of action in all instances where the violation is an ac-
tionable wrong ... : he who procures the wrong is a joint wrong-doer. 
[1853]2 El. & Bl. at 232, 118 Eng. Rep. at 755. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Coleridge men-
tioned that the remedy for breach of contract is by the general rule of the law confined to the con-
tracting parties. [d. at 246, 118 Eng. Rep. at 760. (Justice Coleridge focused on the principle of 
the privity of contract). He continued: 
I need not argue that, if there be any remedy by action against a stranger, it must be by 
action on the case .... Unless there be a loss thus directly and proximately connected 
with the act, the mere intention, or even the endeavor to produce it will not found the 
action. The existence of the intention, that is the malice, will in some cases be an essen-
tial ingredient in order to constitute the wrongfulness or injurious nature of the act; but 
it will neither supply the want of the act itself, or its hurtful consequence. 
/d. Justice Coleridge also noted the impossibility of drawing "a line between advice, persuasion, 
enticement and procurement." [d. Finally, he interpreted the Ordinance of Labourers in a strict 
sense: looking at the words and the language of the preamble of the Ordinance, "it is clear that 
mechanics and labourers in husbandry were the principle objects of the statute." /d. But Justice 
Coleridge could not convince the other judges, and judgment was for the plaintiff. According to 
Draft 14, supra note 3, S 766, Comment c, at 38, lies the significance ofLumleyv. Gye "in its ex-
tension of the rule of liability to nontortious methods of inducement." 
22. Bowen v. Hall, [1881]6 Q.B.D. 333. 
23. Temperton v. Russell, [1893]1 Q.B. 715. 
24. [1901] K.B. 495. 
25. [d. at 510. 
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cepted; early decisions, especially of the American courts, that refused to ex-
tend the principle beyond contracts of employment26 have been overruled. 27 
III. SOLUTIONS IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
Before examining the underlying concepts which have led to different solu-
tions in the different countries, a survey of these solutions should be made. 28 
A. United States 
After the principle of Lumley v. Gye was adopted in the United States,29 it 
was held' 'that the sanctity of the existing contract relation takes precedence 
over any interest in unrestricted competition .... "30 This principle found ap-
plication especially in cases of offers of advantageous terms to induce violation 
of exclusive agency agreements and in cases of purchase of goods in disregard 
of contracts limiting their resale. Thus, a third person who induced on con-
tracting party to break the contract became liable to the other contracting 
party. 
In Draft 14 the Council of the American Law Institute proposes that 
[0 ]ne who intentionally induces or otherwise intentionally causes a 
third person not to perform a contract with another, other than a 
contract to marry, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary 
loss resulting from the breach of contract. 31 
26. E.g., Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Comm'n Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 
93 (1897); if. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 493-94; Harper, Interference with ContrllCtual Rela-
tions, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (1952-53) [hereinafter cited as Harper). See also RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS S 766; Draft 14, supra note 3, S 766, Comment d, at 40; Sayre, supra note 3, at 671; PROS-
SER, supra note 5, at 930; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 P. 492 (1893); Ashley v. Dixon, 48 
N.Y. 430 (1872). 
27. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 930; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 
(1941). 
28. For a more perceptive description, see the commentators cited below. 
29. See, e.g., Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R., 151 U.S. 1 (1894); Meason v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 244 (1940); Rullsell v. Bovard, 153 Kan. 729. 113 P.2d 1064 
(1941); Beckman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205,80 N.E. 817 (1907); Sumwalt Ice & Coal Co. v. 
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403, 80 A. 48 (1908); Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, 1 
N.W.2d 539 (1942); Joyce v. Great N.R., 100 Minn. 225, 110 N.W. 975 (1907); Schechter v. 
Friedman, 141 N.J.Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (1948); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 173 N.E. 
674 (1931); Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 141 N.E. 914 (1923); Winston v. Williams 
Lumber Co., 227 N.C. 339, 42 S.E.2d 218 (1947); Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874); 
Chilton v. Oklahoma Tire Co., 180 Okla. 29, 67 P.2d 27 (1937); Bliss v. Holmes, 156 Okla. 40, 
9 P.2d 718 (1932); Sears v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 8 Wash.2d 447, 112 P.2d 850 
(1941); Husting v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 238 N.W. 626 (1931). 
30. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 945. 
31. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 766. The corresponding section of the original Restatement reads: 
•• Except as stated in Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise pur-
posely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter into or con-
tinue a business relation with another, is liable to the other for the ·harm caused thereby." 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 766. Because the defendant's privileges may differ, the Council of the 
American Law Institute treats these in a separate section now, i. e., in SS 767 et Sit!. See Draft 14, 
supra note 3, (Note to Institute no. 3 at 30). Since Draft 14 clearly reflects the case law, it is useful 
to refer to the Draft. 
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The Comment states that one "may not, without justification, intentionally 
frustrate dealings that have been reduced to the form of a contract. "32 
The liability of the inducer is not always limited to the loss as such. For ex-
ample, Tennessee makes it more serious to persuade someone to violate a con-
tract than to violate his own. The person who induces any party to break the 
contract "shall be liable in treble the amount of damages resulting from or in-
cident to the breach of [the] contract."H 
No difficulties have arisen over whether the same rules are applicable if the 
violated contract is voidable. It is generally held that it makes no difference to 
the external relationship, that between the Creditor and the third party who is 
inducing the breach, whether the contract is valid or only voidable. 34 The im-
portant question is whether the particular contract was in force at the moment 
of the inducement for there is no liability for inducing breach of a contract if 
the contract was void in fact at that time, rather than merely voidableY Il-
lustrations hereto are the so-called "yellow dog" contracts by which 
employees agree with their employers not to join labor unions. 36 As these con-
tracts are made unenforceable by federal and much state legislation,37 induc-
ing breach of such a clause does not render the inducer liable. Moreover, if a 
contract is terminable at will, this should deny the Creditor an action against 
the person who had induced the Debtor to terminate the contractual relation-
ship. Sayre stated concisely: "The doctrine growing out of Lumley v. Gye can-
not be extended to cases where no contract was broken. "38 The Creditor has 
in such a case no right to have the contract with the Debtor continued. He has 
only an expectancy which is comparable with the expectancy of a businessman 
32. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 766, Comment b, at 37. The text continues: "There is no general 
duty to do business with all who ofTer their services, wares or patronage; but there is a general 
duty not to interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expectancies of trade with 
third persons, whether or not they are secured by contract, unless the interference is privileged 
under the circumstances." !d. § 766. 
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-113 (1964). 
34. The Supreme Court of Oregon stated with respect to a contract which was unenforceable 
due to the Statute of Frauds: "The statute of frauds is enacted for the protection of persons 
sought to be charged [on the contract]. It is personal and not available to strangers." Ringler v. 
Ruby, 117 Or. 455, 460, 244 P. 509 (1926). 
35. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 932; 1 HARPER &JAMES, supra note 2, at 495-96; Harper, supra 
note 26, at 879. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 766, Comment f, at 40-41 states: 
It is not, however, necessary that [the agreement] be legally enforceable against the 
[Debtor]. A promise may be valid and subsisting contract even though it is void-
able .... The [Debtor] may have a defense against action on the contract, which would 
permit him to avoid it and escape liability on it ifhe sees fit to do so. Until he does, the 
contract is a valid and subsisting relation, with which the actor is not permitted, 
without justification, to interfere. 
Contra, Little v. Children, 12 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Civ.App. 1928). 
36. E.g., Exchange Bakery & Rest. Co. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927). 
37. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 931. 
38. Note 3 supra, at 701-02. 
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that his customer will continue to do business with himj 39 the interest of a com-
petitor in the free opportunity to acquire the business for himself must prevail 
over the interest of the Creditor in continuing the contractual relationship. +0 
At the present time, generally, no limitation confines the Creditor's action 
to cases where the inducer used some illegal or unfair means, such as fraud, 
intimidation or secondary boycott. +1 It is sufficient that the inducement was 
intended. The Restatement of Torts+2 adopts the position that while inten-
tionally causing the breach of contract is necessary and sufficient, it is not 
essential that the intent to cause the breach 
be the actor's sole or paramount purpose. It is sufficient that he 
designs this result whether because he desires it is an end in itself or 
because he regards it as necessary, even if regrettable, means to 
some other end. +3 
However, contrary is the view of Sayre who distinguishes between "procur-
ing" or "inducing" breach of contract on one hand and "causing" it on the 
other. A breach is merely caused, not procured, 
when it occurs only as an incidental and undesired, though it may be 
clearly foreseen and inevitable, by-product in the seeking of some 
quite different object, unconnected with the object which led to the 
making of the contract. ++ 
39. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 946. 
40. Prosser mentions a "privilege of competition which extends to inducing the termination of 
agreements terminabl:: at will, whether they concern employment or other relations." Id. C/, 
Vincent Horwitz Co. v. Copper, 352 Pa. 7,41 A.2d 870 (1945); Kingsbery v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 315 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.Civ.App. 1958). For an interference with a contract terminable at will 
to be actionable, other elements and factors must be present. See Jensch, Interference, 38 TUL. L. 
REV. 458 (1963-1964). The Draft 14 seems to go in the other direction, stating that until the 
Debtor has terminated the agreement, "the contract is valid and subsisting, and the defendant 
may not, without justification, interfere with it. The fact that the contract is terminable at will is, 
however, to be taken into account in determining the damages which the plaintiff has suffered by 
reason of its breach." Note 3 supra, § 766, Comment g, at 41. See also, Chambers v. Probst, 145 
Ky. 381, 140 S.W. 572 (1911), and cases cited therein. 
41. See Daly v. Cornwell, 34 App.Div. 27, 54 N.Y.S. 107 (1898); Dejong v. B.G. Behrman 
Co., 148 App.Div. 37, 131 N.Y.S. 1083 (1911); see also, Sayre, supra note 3, at 674. Louisiana, 
however, focuses on the means used. It is held that the inducer does not commit a tort unless 
means are used which are unlawful in themselves. See Robert Heard Hale, Inc. v. Gaiennie, 102 
So.2d 324 (La.App. 1958); Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515,8 So.2d 361 (1942); PROSSER, supra 
note 5, at 930. This solution in the "Napoleonic Code State" is interesting because the French 
courts generally do not consider the means used by the inducer as significant for classifying his 
conduct as unlawful. 
42. § 766, Comment f, at 40. The Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment k, at 44, as well as 
PROSSER supra note 5, at 936, have broadened this theory to encompass other kinds ofinterference 
with a contract: "There is no technical requirement as to the kind of conduct that may result in 
interference with the contract. It may be any conduct which conveys to the [Debtor) the actor's 
desire to influence him not to deal with the other." Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment k, at 
44. . 
43. Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment h, at 42. See, e.g., 1 HARPER&JAMES,supra note 2, 
at 497,498. 
44. Sayre, supra note 3, at 678. 
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For Sayre, in contrast to Harper and James and the authors of Draft 14, it is 
the purpose, and not only the intent, that makes the actor liable.·s However, 
the distinction between the two opinions is not as significant as it might seem. 
Harper and J ames·6 and Draft 14H suggest that, if the interference with the 
Creditor's contract was incidental in character, the question of privilege for 
the interference becomes especially important. This corrective to the stricter 
theory is also supported by Prosser.u As the cases show, the courts have paid 
attention to the question as to whether the third person acted with the purpose 
of interfering with the contract only where the actor interfered with contrac-
tual relations without having induced a breach. There, the courts have fol-
lowed both theories.·9 
The inducer must have had knowledge ofthe existence of the contract or, at 
least, of facts from which the existence of the contract can generally and 
reasonably be inferred. 50 This principle is perhaps justified as far as the actor's 
liability is concerned,sl but in the author's view not if one speaks of inducing as 
such. For inducement, it is only relevant that the third person provoked the 
Debtor's decision to commit the concrete violation ofthe contract. The notion 
of "inducing," as different from the third person's liability, is solely a prob-
lem of causation, 52 and not of intent or negligence. 
The presence or absence of ill will or other motives may be important, in 
another context, for determining if the inducer's conduct was privileged. 53 In 
45. The rules "apply also to intentional interference, ... in which the defendant does not act 
for the purpose of interfering with the contract, or desire it, but he knows that such interference is 
certain, or substantially certain to occur as a result of his acts. They apply, in other words, to in-
terferences which are incidental to the actor's independent purpose and desire, but are known to 
him to be necessary consequences of his acts." Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Commentj, at 43. 
46. Note 3 supra, at 498. 
47. Note 3 supra, § 766, Comment j, at 43. 
48. Note 5 supra, at 942. The idea was also mentioned by Carpenter, Interference, 41 HARV. L. 
REV. 745 (1927-1928) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter). 
49. Compare, e.g., Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., 274 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1921), with Isbrandtsen 
v. Local 1291 ofInt'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953); see also, PROSSER. supra 
note 5, at 941-42 n.79 et seq. 
50. See, e.g., Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); 
Kerr v. DuPree, 35 Ga.App. 122, 132 S.E. 393 (1926); McGurk v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457, 
85 N.E. 576 (1908); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 173 N.E. 674 (1930). 
51. See Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment i, at 42; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, at 
497. 
52. To ascertain the existence of inducement, one must examine whether the contract would 
not have been violated at all, or at least not in the way it has been, without the third person's in-
fluence. 
53. Cj Harper, supra note 26, at 873; Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766, Comment r, at 49. Some 
uncertainties arose in connection with the significance of "malice" or "maliciously" which no-
tions were already used by the judges who decided the leading case Lumley v. Gye. Sayre states that 
these notions were employed "with such an evident contrariety of meanings, that it was impossi-
ble to determine ... what limits were to be set to the doctrine growing out of that case. " Note 3 
supra, at 673. Only by the end ofthe nineteenth century, a general consensus could be found that 
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Beckman v. Marsters54 the plaintiff, proprietor of a tourist agency in Boston, and 
the Jamestown Hotel Corporation made a contract in which the plaintiff 
agreed to represent the hotel corporation throughout the New England states, 
to establish sub-agencies in that territory, and to use every possible endeavor 
personally and through his agents to book persons for the "Inside Inn," a 
hotel erected by the Jamestown Hotel Corporation. It was further agreed that 
the plaintiff was to be the exclusive agent of the hotel corporation in the ter-
ritory, that the corporation was to pay twenty-five cents a day for each person 
sent by him to the hotel and was to furnish the plaintiff with all necessary 
"literature." The defendant, another ticket and tourist agent in Boston, a 
competitor of the plaintiff, induced the hotel corporation to enter into a con-
tract with him, 
whereby it was agreed that [he 1 should have the same rights that had 
been given to the [plaintiff], and that he should be paid by the cor-
poration 25 cents per capita per day for each guest whom he should 
secure for the "Inside Inn. "55 
The defendant had knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff and the 
corporation, and he acted for the purpose of getting for himself business to 
which the plaintiff alone was entitled under his contract. Justice Loring stated 
that 
in the case at bar there was no necessity of proving spite or ill will 
toward the plaintiff. This is not a case where there was an abuse of 
what, if done in good faith, would have been a justification, but a 
case where the defendant with knowledge of the contract between the 
hotel corporation and the plaintiff intentionally and without 
justification induced the hotel corporation to break it. 56 
the doctrine stated by Lumley v. Gye was not confined to instances of acting with "malevolence." 
But what positively is meant by "malice" is still unclear though the courts use and repeat this for-
mula more or less regularly as one of the requirements for Tort. According to Beckman v. 
Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817 (1907), the existence of "malice" consists in proving the 
defendant's knowledge of the contract and his intention to induce the Debtor to breach it. The 
defendant must have acted without justification. "Malice" was becoming little more than an 
empty phrase "with small practical influence in the reaching of actual decisions." Sayre, supra 
note 3, at 675, 673, 674. In a vague way, Harper and James state that" 'Malice' means little 
more than the intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interests without a privilege to do so." Note 3 
supra, at 492. What the meaning of "little more than intentional invasion" should be remains 
vague. After all, Draft 14, in § 766, Comment s, at 49, mentions "that what is meant is not 
malice in the sense of ill will but merely purposeful interference without justification." See also 
Carpenter, supra note 48, at 736. Compare, Sayre, supra note 3, at 679 ("The requisite 'malice' ... 
must be the conscious intention to appropriate for oneself that which by law belongs to another, 
- something akin to the animus furandi of a thief. ") 
54. 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817 (1907). 
55. /d. at 208,80 N.E. at 817. 
56. /d. at 212,80 N.E. at 819. 
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The defendant was restrained from directly or indirectly acting as agent of the 
hotel corporation within the New England states. 
In some situations, the third person may have ajustification or privilege for 
inducing the Debtor to break his contract. As Draft 14 suggests, 57 if the in-
terference with the Creditor's contract was incidental, the question especially 
arises whether the action was privileged. 58 The authors inserted in the Draft a 
"factor" for determining whether an act described in § 766 is privileged: 
"[w]hether the act is for the purpose of causing the interference, or it is not 
desired and is merely incidental to another purpose. "59 
Practically unanimously, courts deny that the right of competition is a 
justification. "The right of competition is not the right to destroy contractual 
rights. "60 In Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,62 the court said: 
A party may not, however, under the guise of competition actively 
and affirmatively induce the breach of a competitor's contract in 
order to secure an economic advantage over that competitor. 62 
This principle is also recognized in Draft 14; the Comment on subsection 2 
says: 
[T]he social interest in the security of transactions and the greater 
definiteness of C's expectancy outweigh the interests of A's freedom 
of action in this situation. 63 
Particularly under the influence of Knapp v. Penfield,6. Petit v. Cuneo, 65 
57. Note 3 supra, S 766, Comment j, at 43. 
58. In connection with the opinions of HARPER & JAMES, and PROSSER, see notes 45 & 47 supra. 
59. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 767(1). Since S 766, Comment j, is a compromise position, the 
drafters put clause (I) into brackets. This clause is only to be added if the compromise is ap-
proved. See id. S 766 (Note to Institute at 65). The textual identification of "purpose" with 
"desire" is confusing. 
To make clear the difference between "procuring" and "causing" a breach of contract -
whereas only "procuring" should make the third person liable, see note 43 supra - Sayre had to 
refer to motives. Thus, the motive for the inducer's conduct plays an eminent role in Sayre's 
theory. The distinction between these two notions "depends, in the last analysis, upon a purely 
mental element." Sayre, supra note 3, at 678. Sayre continues: "If cases of incidentally causing 
breaches of contract are to be distinguished from cases of procuring, and if this distinction must 
rest in the last analysis upon the evident motive which caused the defendant to act, there remains 
the question of just what kind of motive must be proved." Id. at 679. 
60. Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927) (and cases cited 
therein). 
61. 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941). 
62. Id. at 37, 112 P.2d at 633. Cj also Romano v. Wilbur Ellis and Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 670, 
186 P.2d 1012 (1947). The only case found indicating that any interference with contractual rela-
tions based on competition is a justification is Chambers v. Probst, 145 Ky. 381, 140 S.W. 572 
(1911). 
63. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 768, Comment i, at 74. With regard to other cases of interference 
with contractual relations, see id. S 768(1)(a)-(d), at 66. 
64. 143 Misc. 132, 256 N.Y.S. 41 (1932). 
65. 290 Ill.App. 16, 7 N.E.2d 774 (1937). 
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Morgan v. Andrews,66 Ford v. C. E. Wilson and CO.,67 and Winters v. University 
District Building and Loan Ass 'n, 68 and contrary to the Restatement of Torts, 
Draft 14 recognizes the "Privilege of One Having Financial Interest in 
Business of Person Induced." This reaches cases of inducing breach of con-
tract and not only those of "general" interference with contractual relations. 
However, it is required that 
the actor (a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts to pro-
tect his interest from being prejudiced by the contract or relation. 69 
Under "financial interest in another's business" is understood "an interest in 
the nature of an investment. "70 Persons who may be considered to have this 
privilege are a part owner of a business, a partner or stockholder, or a bond-
holder as well as another creditor. 71 If the actor's conduct is directed to pro-
tecting his interest from prejudice by the contractual relation, it is unimpor-
tant and immaterial that he also takes a "malicious delight" in causing 
harm,12 provided that his methods are not improper.73 
66. 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 (1895). 
67. 129 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1932). 
68. 2681ll.App. 147 (1932). 
69. Draft 14, supra note 3, § 769, at 75; see also PROSSER, supra note 5, at 944-45. 
70. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 769, Comment a, at 75. 
71. [d. But "the interest of a person who looks to the other for business and will lose business 
opportunities if the other enters into the business relations involved is not a financial interest 
under the rule stated in this Section." [d. In this context, a case should be mentioned in which the 
issue was decided whether directors were to be held liable for having caused their corporation to 
breach a contract. Justice Gavegan stated: 
In the exercise of their discretIOn, and in acting on their judgment for the benefit of their 
corporation, the directors should be free from possible liability of that kind. Moreover, 
it would not seem feasible to draw a line between directors' acts which are dictated by 
no other motive than the performance of their duties as directors and their acts which, 
though they may be performed in transacting the business of the corporation, are ac-
tuated by ulterior motives - such as the motive to bring about a breach of corporate 
contract. 
Lukach v. Blair, 108 Misc. 20, 178 N.Y.S. 8 (1919). The question is whether or not it is 
necessary to take refuge in the argument. The board of directors is a body by which the will of the 
corporation is formed and through the members of which the corporation is acting. The decision 
ofthe board of directors is made by its members (or by a majority of them). But, since the will of 
the corporation is formed by the board or by its members, it would be a contradictio in adiecto to say 
the board can influence the will of a corporation in the sense of a third person and thus - like an 
inducer - cause the corporation to breach its contract. A decision of the board can be a decision 
to commit a breach of contract, but never an inducement to do so. 
72. See Draft 14, supra note 3, § 769, Comment b, at 76. 
73. Improper means or methods include violence, intimidation, threats, misrepresentation, 
defamation, bribery. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 936-37; Draft 14, supra note 3, § 769, Comment 
c, at 77, S 768, Comment on Clause b, at 70; see also Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 151 
U.S. 1 (1893); Sparksv. McCrary, 156 Ala. 382, 47 So. 332(1908); Bartlettv. Federal Outfitting 
Co., 133 Cal.App. 747, 24 P.2d 877 (1933); Stebbins v. Edwards, 101 Okla. 188, 224 P. 714 
(1924). 
54 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2, No.1 
Other privileges are the "Privilege of Person Responsible for Welfare of 
Another";74 the "Privilege to Give Information or Advice";75 and the 
"Privilege to Assert Bona Fide Claim. "76 Draft 14 mentions as a special 
category "Contracts Illegal or Contrary to Public Policy." It states: 
One who by proper means causes the non-performance of a bargain 
which is illegal, or the purpose or effect of which is in violation of a 
defined public policy, is not liable for pecuniary harm resulting from 
such non-performance. 77 
The Drafters broadened this Section from the Restatement (First); thus, con-
tracts illegal for reasons other than violation of public policy are included. 
Rightly, in the author's view, Section 774 of Draft 14 no longer mentions 
"Privilege" because this provision covers above all cases in which contracts 
are entirely void, and not merely voidable. It would be illogical to say the in-
74. "One who is charged with responsibility for the welfare of another is privileged purposely 
to cause him not to perform the contract if the actor (a) does not employ improper means and (b) 
acts to protect the welfare of the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 770. It might be important to 
mention that this privilege extends to volunteered as well as requested advice, in contrast to the 
privilege of S 772(b) of Draft 14 as described in note 75 infra. See Legris v. Marcotte, 129 IlI.App. 
67 (1906). 
75. "One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract ... with a third 
person, by giving the other (a) truthful information without more or (b) honest advice within the 
scope of a request for advice from the other." Draft 14, supra note 3, S 772, at 79. The aim of this 
rule is to protect the public and private interest" in freedom of communication and friendly inter-
course." !d. S 722, Comment a, at 79. In this context, see PROSSER, supra note 5, at 944. This 
category of privilege is especially important for lawyers, medical doctors, bankers and other types 
of experts and counselors in connection with the performance of their professions. Sayre, supra 
note 3, at 683, too, refers to the "lawyer-instance." He also admits that the actor should escape 
liability, but he does not mention "justification" or "privilege." Instead, he states: "The real 
reason seems to be the fact that the defendant ... may be said to have incidentally caused, but 
not to have procured the breach, or, to be more precise, the fact that the defendant was not seek-
ing to appropriate for himself the promised advantages of the plaintiff, but was seeking an object 
quite foreign to that which the plaintiff sought in the making of the contract." [d. (For a discus-
sion of Sayre's thesis concerning the difference between "procuring" a breach of contract and 
"causing" a breach, see notes 59 and 44 supra). See also, Lee v. Silver, 262 App.Div. 149, 28 
N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941); Coakley v. Degner, 191 Wis. 170,210 N.W. 359 (1926); Arnold v. Mof-
fitt, 30 R.1. 310, 75 A. 502 (1910). Of course, difficulties in practice may arise in answering the 
question as to whether or not the advice was' 'within the scope of the request for the advice." The 
Drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts do not give any concrete solution. They point out 
that it is •• a question of fact under the circumstances to be determined in the light of the total 
transaction between the adviser and the person advised." Draft 14, supra note 3, S 722, Comment 
c, at 80. 
76. "One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract ... with a third 
person by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally protected interest of 
his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the con-
tract or transaction." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 773. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 944; see also 
Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 244 (1940); O'Brien v. Western Union 
Tel. Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 P. 441 (1911). 
77. Draft 14, supra note 3, S 77 4. 
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ducer was privileged to act when, on the other hand, the "Creditor" himself 
has, in fact, no claim against his "contractual" opponent. 78 
B. France 
Kurt Lipstein's statement, "[t]he common law tort of inducing a breach of 
contract ... does not appear in the civil law" 79 has been heavily criticized: 
This opinion is subject to question though it stems from a highly 
respected expert in comparative law. As far as it refers to the Ger-
man, Austrian or Swiss law, the statement may be accurate with cer-
tain reservations. But in as much as it relates to the French law, 
which is one of the main representatives of the "civil law family," 
[the] opinion is imprecise80 
The French courts recognize the liability of the third person who, knowing 
the existence of a contractual relationship, induces a contracting party to 
breach the contract. The statutory basis for this liability is Article 1382 of the 
Civil Code: 
Any act of a person which causes damage to another makes him by 
whose fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation for the 
damage.8t 
One of the leading French decisions is the Huguette Duflos Case,82 almost ex-
actly parallel to Lumley v. Gye. A theatre director engaged Huguette Duflos 
though he knew that the actress, by accepting his offer, would violate her con-
tract with the Comedie Fran~aise. Huguette Duflos and the director were held 
jointly and severally liable for the loss caused to the Creditor of the first con-
tract. An appeal from the judgment of the Cour de Paris (Ire chambre) was 
dismissed by the Chambre des Requetes on June 2, 1930. 
As -mentioned above, knowledge of the contract's existence is generally the 
only requirement for the inducer to be liable for his action. 83 In addition to 
knowled~e, "fraudulent machinations" (concert frauduleux) are required in 
cases of multiple sales of real estate, that is, the second purchaser is not pro-
tected if his purchase is based on a concert frauduleux with the seller, though all 
requirements for registration of the sale were fulfilled by the second purchaser 
before the flI'st completed them.8t 
78. See also PROSSER, suPra note 5, at 931; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, at 495; Harper, 
supra note 26, at 878-79; Miles Medical Co. v.J.D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Bailey 
v. Banister, 200 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1952); Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106 
(1921); Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 102 S.E. 325 (1919). 
79. Lipstein, Prollt;ted Itlterest itl tM Law oj Torts, 1963 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 103. 
80. J.-M. Grossen, La rlspotlSabi/iU flu tUrs complice ilia violatiotl d'utl contrat, in MJ!.LANGES 
WILHELM SCHOENBERGER 126 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Grossen]. 
81. C. CN. art. 1382 (Fr.) (A. von Mehren trans.). 
82. GAZ.PAL. 1930, 2, 119. 
83. S" Cour d'Appel de Paris, 18 March 1927, GAZ.PAL. 1927, 2, 804-85; Chambre des Re-
quetes, 17 June 1927, GAZ.PAL. 1927,2, 431 ~ arret de la Chambre civile, section civile, (1948] D. 
Jur. 421 note Lenoan; arret de la Chambre Civile, [1958] D. Jur. 763. 
84. Judgment of the Chambre des Requetes, [1925] S. Jur. II 1, 101. 
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However, inducing someone to sell the object to a person other than the one 
to whom it was originally agreed is not regarded as inducement to break a con-
tract because, under Article 1583 of the Civil Code, a violation of the first pur-
chaser's claim is not possible at all. As soon as the parties (seller and pur-
chaser) have agreed upon the object and the price, the sale becomes complete 
between them and ownership vests in the purchaser as against the vendor even 
if the object has not yet been delivered or the price paid. In other words, if the 
second purchaser induces the seller to deliver the specific object to him rather 
than to the first purchaser, there is a possible case of violation of the first pur-
chaser's ownership. The second purchaser is protected only if an object of per-
sonal property was delivered to him and he had acted in good faith regarding 
possession85 or he was registered as the new owner of realty before the first 
purchaser and there was no concert frauduleux with the seller. 86 Most French 
commentators share the courts' opinion that the inducer's liability is 
tortious. 87 
As to enticement of employees, a provision in the Labor Code forbids the 
third person to induce an employee to break his contract with his employer. 88 
In contrast to Switzerland and Germany, however, France has no code on un-
fair competition. Thus, the tort articles of the Civil Code apply to any conduct 
involving unfair competition, as it is often the case in connection with induc-
ing breach of contract. 
C. Federal Republic of Germany 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, as in Switzerland, the situation is 
more complex. Depending upon the applicable statute the conduct of the in-
ducer is classified as unlawful or as contra bonos mores. 89 A further complication 
is that both countries have codes on unfair competition. From a common law 
lawyer's viewpoint it may be difficult to understand why the situation in Ger-
many and Switzerland should be more complicated though both nations have 
statutes applying to the third person's conduct in inducing a breach. The com-
plication arises from several court decisions which make it difficult clearly to 
discern the criteria under which the provisions are applicable to the various 
cases. One must take into account that the courts playa different role in civil 
85. C. CIV. art. 1141 (Fr.). Publicite fonciere, Decree of January 14, 1955. 
86. In this sense, one may say that the transfer of the ownership cannot be invoked against 
third persons unless the object has been transferred to the purchaser or the purchaser has been 
registered. SteJudgment of the Chambre des Requetes, [1925) S. Jur. II 1, 101; R. SAVATIER, LA 
THEORIE DES OBLIGATIONS (VISION JURIDIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE) 211 n.148 (1967); R. KRASSER, 
DER SCHUTZ VERTAGLICHER RECHTE GEGEN EINGRIFFE DRITTER 35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
KRASSER). 
87. See, e.g., A. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 547 (1971). Demogue has another 
point of view: contractual liability of the third person. 7 R. DEMOGUE, TRAlTE DES OBLIGATIONS 
EN GENERAL, II EFFETS DES OBLIGATIONS 600 (1933). 
88. C. TRAV. art. L. 122-15 (Fr.). 
89. In a broader sense, acts contra bonos mores may be classified as unlawful too. But for an 
easier understanding, one should distinguish here between acts which are unlawful and those 
which are considered contra bonos mores. 
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law countries than within the common law system. The lawmaking of civil law 
courts is largely confined to interpretation of existing statutes and other provi-
sions and the courts do not feel bound to follow precedents in the same way as 
do the common law courts. From this a certain ambiguity may result, espe-
cially where the court cannot find provisions which are explicitly applicable to 
the particular case at hand. Many of the judgments are based on such provi-
sions, so it stands to reason that the more the courts interpret these statutes, 
the more the commentators try to influence the judges in favor of uniform 
judgments. That the commentators, too, reach differing conclusions does not 
help clarify the situation of the actual law. 
In Germany, Section 826 of the Civil Code90 and, in cases of unfair com-
petition, Section 1 of the Statute Against Unfair Competition91 apply to induc-
ing breach of contract where "special provisions" are not applicable. Section 
826 BGB and Section 1 UnlWG forbid actions contra bonos mores. 92 Whereas, 
the VI. Zivilsenat of the former Reichsgericht based its judgments on Section 
826 BGB, the II. Zivilsenat was concerned with cases in the realm of unfair 
competition. In contrast to the II. Zivilsenat, the VI. Zivilsenat required 
"special circumstances" to find the third person liable. "Special cir-
cum stances" could lie in the manner in which the Debtor was induced to breach 
the contract, such as threat or deception,93 untrue suspicions or derogatory 
contentions in relation to the Creditor, 94 inducing the seller to breach his con-
tract (and to transfer the goods to the inducer) by offering a higher price than 
was stipulated with the first buyer, constant and systematic pressure, or the 
promise of warranty against all claims for recourse. 9~ The purpose for which the 
breach of contract was committed and the consequences to the prejudiced 
party96 were further criteria. 
The II. Zivilsenat stated97 that in the course of business intention is the only 
90. Law of Aug. 18, 1896, [1896] BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) [BGB] § 826 
(Ger.). 
91. Law of June 7,1909, [1909] Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Statute against the 
Unfair Competition) [UnlWG] S 1 (Ger.). 
92. S 826 BGB provides that "[O]ne, who designedly injures another in a manner violating 
good morals is bound to indemnify the other for the injury." (W. Loewy, trans.). S 1 UnlWG 
states that "[O]ne, who in the course of business acts with intent to create competition may be 
subject to an order to cease and desist and held liable for damages if his conduct violates good 
morals." 
93. Judgment of May 30,1910, VI. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1910lJuristische Wochenschrift OW] 
705, No.5. 
94. Judgment of May 31,1906, VI. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1906lJW 465. 
95. Judgment of April 27, 1931, VI. Zivilsenat, Ger., 86 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV FUER ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DER OBERSTEN GERICHTE IN DEN DEUTCHEN STAATEN [SEUFFA BD.] 48. 
96. Judgment of April 3. 1913, VI. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1913]JW 866, No. 11; see also Judgment 
of Jan. 26, 1910, VI. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1910] 15 GEWERBUCHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UNO URHE-
BERRECHT [GRUR] 86; Judgment of Jan. 23, 1922, 103 RGZ 421; KRASSER, supra note 86, at 
220. 
97. See Judgment of Dec. 10, 1912, II. Zivilsenat, Ger., 81 RGZ 91; Judgment of April 27, 
1931, II Zivilsenat, Ger., 86 SEUFFA BD. 49. 
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requirement to classify inducement as an act contra bonos mores. The basic pro-
vision applied by this Senat was Section 1 Un1WG. 
The decision of December 10, 1912,98 by the II. Zivilsenat can be con-
sidered the leading case for the later development within the II. Zivilsenat99 
and within the Bundesgerichtshof for Civil Matters, the highest civil court 
under the Constitution of 1949 (Grundgesetz) which adopted the principle of 
that Zivilsenat of its predecessor court. Thus, even in the absence of special 
circumstances, the inducement to break a contract generally contradicts the 
standards of a "fair average businessman" and, therefore, violates the basic 
rules of fair competition within the meaning of Section 1 Un1WG where the 
conduct was (a) intentional and (b) meant to create competition. 100 In a small 
number of cases, however, the Bundesgerichtshof has taken a different posi-
tion and focused on "special circumstances."IOI Unfortunately, all the 
judgments of this court concerned cases where the inducer meant to create 
competition. There is no evidence that the opinion of the II. Zivilsenat of the 
former Reichsgericht would have influenced the Bundesgerichtshof in cases to 
which Section 826 of the BGB rather than Section 1 of the Un1WG applied. 
Some statutes have so far had no great importance for the judicial opinions 
though they are explicitly concerned with inducing breach of a contract. Section 
20 of the Un1 WG deals with inducement to disclose business secrets confided 
98. [d. 
99. See Judgment of March 16, 1934, II. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1934] 39 GRUR 610; Judgment of 
Nov. 6, 1934, II. Zivilsenat, Ger., (1935] 40 GRUR 323; Judgment of Oct. 11, 1935, II. 
Zivilsenat, Ger., 148 RGZ 370; Judgment of Nov. 2, 1938, II. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1939] 44 
GRUR 566; see also cases cited in note 100 infra. In the Judgment of Oct. 6,1931, II. Zivilsenat, 
Ger., 133 RGZ 330, and Judgment of May 10, 1932, II. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1932] Markenschutz 
und Wettbewerb [MuW] 337, the II. Zivilsenat demanded, in connection with vertical price 
binding contracts, as an additional requirement for the application of S 1 UnlWg that the in-
ducer must have obtained an advantage over his competitors. In the Judgment of Oct. 27, 1933, 
II. Zivilsenat, Ger., [1934] MuW 64, the same Senat focused on the requirement of "special cir-
cumstances," similar to the reasoning of the VI. Zivilsenat. 
100. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., (1956] 58 GRUR 275; see also 
Judgment of Nov. 13, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., (1954] 56 GRUR 164; Judgment of 
March 17,1961, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., [1961]63 GRUR 483; Judgment of March 8, 
1962, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 37 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BG HZ] 32; Judgment 
of June 14, 1963, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., (1964] 66 GRUR 157; Judgment of Jan. 10, 
1964, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., [1964] 66 GRUR 323. 
101. In the Judgment of May 20, 1960, (1960]62 GRUR 559, the Bundesgerichtshof, in ap-
plying S 1 U n1 WG, has focused on whether the third person had induced the Debtor to breach an 
"essential obligation" of the contract. Seven years later, in the Judgment of April 26, 1967, 
[1968] 70 GRUR 100, the court focused, in connection with a price-binding clause, on a similar 
circumstance as had the Reichsgericht in the Judgment of May 10, 1932, supra note 99. Later, the 
Bundesgerichtshof declared that "all circumstances of the single case" must be taken into ac-
count in deciding if the inducer acted contra bonos mores in the sense of S 1 Un1WG. Judgment of 
March 28, 1969, [1969] 71 GRUR 474. In 1970, the court returned to the reasoning of the Judg-
ment of Dec. 10, 1912, supra note 97, and upheld that decision without reservation. Judgment of 
Sept. 25, 1970, (1970] 73 GRUR 122; Judgment of Jan. 30, 1976, [1976] 78 GRUR 372. 
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in the course of employment; Section 125 of the German Ordinance of Trade 
(Gewerbeordnung or GeWO) of July 26, 1900, involves enticement of 
journeymen. Both provisions are considered so-called "special protection 
laws" within the meaning of Section 823, II BGB. Therefore, cases of induc-
ing breach of contract to which Section 20 Un1WG and Section 125 GeWO 
apply are classified as unlawful (widerrechtlich) and not as contra bonos mores. 102 
As mentioned before, the opinions ofthe commentators are divergent. One 
states that intentionally inducing breach of a contract is generally an act contra 
bonos mores. 103 It is unimportant to him whether the third person induces with 
the intent to create competition. Others are of the same opinion. l04 In con-
trast, some commentators are more restrictive.lo~ Generally they hold that the 
sole intention is not enough to classify the inducement as an act contra bonos 
mores; rather, they focus either on the goal the third person pursues or on the 
means he applies. They mention as goals, prejudice to the Creditor and pur-
suit of profit, and as means, threat, intimidation, fraud, indemnification for 
penalty for nonperformance of the contract and planned, systematic pro-
ceedings by the inducer .106 
Regarding cases of inducing with the purpose to create competition, several 
commentatorsl07 agree with the reasoning of the II. Zivilsenat in the Judg-
102. For details sei P.H. EULAU, VERLEITUNGZUMVERTRAGSBRUCHUNDAuSNUTZUNGFREM· 
DEN VERTRAGSBRUCHS 100-01, 104 et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as EULAu). 
103. Herrmann, Vertleitung zum Vertragsbruch, [1955) 57 GRUR 21, 23. 
104. W. FIKENTSCHER, SCHULDRECHT S 103, 1.,6 (4th ed. 1973); Larenz, Grundsaetzliches zu S 
138 BGB, in 7 JURISTEN-JAHRBUCH 109 (1966); 2 E. REIMER, WETTEWERBS UND 
WARENZEICHENRECHT 35. Kapitel, N.3 (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as E. REIMER); A. 
ROSENTHAL, GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (KOMMENTAR) § I, N .140 (9th ed. 
1969) [hereinafter cited as ROSENTHAL). 
105. Groh, Sittenwidrige Erfuellungsvereitelung, in 3 DIE REICHSGERICHTSPRAXIS 1M DEUTSCHEN 
RECHTSLEBEN, FESTGABE DER jURISTISCHEN FAKULTAETEN ZUM 50jAEHRIGEN BESTEHEN DES 
REICHSGERICHTS 131 (1929); D. REIMER, DEUTSCHLAND, 3 DAS RECHT DES UNLAUTERN WETT· 
BEWERBS IN DEN MITGUEDSTAATEN DER EUROPAEISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 249, 
N.361 (E. Ulmer ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as REIMER); Kiss, Die Verleitung zum Vertragsbruch, in 
1908 DEUTSCHEJURISTEN-ZEITUNG [DJZ) 686; Haager, Einzelne Schuldverhaeltnisse, S 826, Anm. 
29, in 2 DAS BUERGERUCHE GESETZBUCH MIT BESONDERER BERUECKSICHTIGUNG DER 
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES REICHSGERICHTS UND DES B UNDESGERICHTSHOFES (Reichsgerichtsraeten 
und Bundesrichtern eds., 11 th ed. 1960); Enneccerus & Lehmann, Recht der Schuldverhaeltnisse, in 
2 LEHRBUCHS DES BUERGERUCHEN RECHTS S 236, III, 1 lit. d (L. Enneccerus, T. Kipp & M. 
Wolff 1958); Reichel, Reverssystzm und Aussenseiter, in 7 ARCHIV FUER DIE CIVIUSTISCHE PRAXIS, 
NEUE FOLGE 257 (1927); Fischer, Die Rechtswidrigkeit mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Privatrechts, 
in 21 ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM PRIVATRECHT UND ZIVlLPROZESS DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 159 (0. 
Fischer ed. 1911). 
106. For more details, see EULAu, supra note 102, at 51 et seq. 
107. REIMER, supra note 105, at N.360-1, 248-49; A. KRAFT, INTERESSENABWAEGUNG UND 
GUTE SITTEN 1M WETTBEWERBSRECHT 238-39 (1963); R. CALLMANN, DER UNLAUTERE WETT-
BEWERB: KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB MIT NOTVEROJU). 
NUNG YOM 9 MAERZ 1932 UND ZU DEN MATERIELLRECHTLICHEN VORSCHRIFTEN DES GESETZES 
ZUM SCHUTZE DER W ARENBEZEICHNUNGEN S I, para. 90 (2d ed. 1932); H. TETZNER, KOMMEN-
TAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB 74 (1950). 
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ment of December 10, 1912.108 Another theory,109 similar to that of the 
Bundesgerichtshof in the decision of May 20, 1960,110 requires that the third 
person induced the Debtor to break an "essential obligation" of the contract. 
Othersll1 criticize the opinions of those commentators who would make liabil-
ity depend differently, according as the inducer acts with or without the pur-
pose of creating competition. 
D. Switzerland 
In contrast to the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Switzerland is rather sparse in cases involving inducing breach of a 
contract. The reason may lie in Swiss courts following a more restrictive prac-
tice as to the inducer's liability than do the courts of other countries. 
Therefore, in Switzerland it is much more difficult for a Creditor successfully 
to file suit against the inducer. 
As in Germany, in Switzerland one may (apart from one minor 
exception) 11 2 distinguish between cases to which a "general statute," Article 
41, II of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations [OR] is applicable, and those 
to which provisions on unfair competition apply. According to Article 41, II 
OR, "[e]very person who, contra bonos mores, wilfully causes damage to another 
is ... liable for compensation."II! In a similar way to the German courts in 
cases to which Section 826 BGB applies, the Swiss Federal Court 
(Bundesgericht) focuses on "special, aggravating circumstances" which are required 
to make the inducer liable. Such circumstances may lie either in the purpose the 
inducer pursues or in the means he applies. A purpose which has been held suf-
ficient for liability is the purpose to prejudice based on the mere thirst for 
revenge; a means is wilfull deceit. 1H 
In contrast to the German Un1WG, the Swiss Statute on Unfair Competi-
tion [UWG] doeS' not mention "actions contra bonos mores," but it forbids the 
"abuse of business competition by deceptive and other means which con-
travene the basic rules of goodfaith"115 That is, in Switzerland, acts against fair 
competition are classified as unlawful. 116 Paragraph II of Article 1 UWG cites 
108. 8i RGZ 91. 
109. A. BAUMBACH & W. HEFERMEHL, WETI1IEWERBS - UND W ARENZEICHENRECHT: WETT· 
BEWERBSRECHT, UnlWG S 1, para. 518 et seq. (11th ed. 1974). 
110. Judgment of May 20,1960, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., [1960]62 GRUR 559. 
111. KRASSER, supra note 86, at 305 et seq.; H. KOZIOL, DIE BEEINTRAECHTIGUNG FREMDER 
FORDERUNGSRECHTE 64 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KOZIOL]; see also E. REIMER, supra note 104, 
at 35.Kapitel, para. 3; ROSENTHAL, supra note 104, S 1, para. 140. 
112. SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] I art. 162 (Switz.), which, in connection 
with BUNDESGESETZ UEBER DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] I art. 50 (Switz.) may apply to cases 
of inducing breach of contract. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 102-03. 
113. G. Wettstein, trans. 
114. See [1926]52 BGE II 376-77; [1931]57 BGE II 493. 
115. Law of Sept. 30, 1943, [1943] Bundesgesetz ueber den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] I 
art. 1 (Switz.) (emphasis added). 
116. See [1966] 92 BGE II 264; [1961] 87 BGE II 115; Germann, Zur Rechtsfindung im Wett-
hewerhsrecht auf tier Grundlage des Entwurfs eines Bundesgesetzes weher den unlautern Wetthewerh, 72 
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some cases which refer more or less explicitly to inducing breach of contract: 
giving or offering allowances to employees, agents or other accessories which 
are not due them violates the basic rules of good faith. 117 The provision 
presupposes that these allowances are intended to or suitable to induce the 
employees, agents or other accessories to commit a violation of their duty and 
to procure for the inducer or another person some advantage.us According to 
Article 1, II lit. f, someone who induces employees, agents or other accessories 
to disclose a manufacturing or business secret contravenes the rules of good 
faith. It is necessary, however, that the employee, agent or other accessory has 
a duty to keep the secret.119 
The Bundesgericht focused in two decisions on "special circumstances."12o 
Unfortunately, in both cases the "predecessor of the UWG," Article 48 OR, 
applied; the Bundesgericht has never had the opportunity to decide a case on 
the basis of the present Statute on Unfair Competition. 
Swiss commentators state that the Creditor has generally no claim against 
the inducer; they are of the view that, apart from third party beneficiary con-
tracts, a contract creates a relationship only between the contractual parties; 
rights and duties can exist only as between them. A claim against a third per-
son should be allowed only as an exception, only if these is an act contra bonos 
mores in the sense of Article 41, II OR.121 Only a few commentators explain 
under which conditions inducing breach of a contract is contra bonos mores. 
Some focus on the inducer's intention to cause damage122 while one adds the 
ZEITSCHRIIT DES BERNISCHENjURISTENVEREINS [ZBjV] 49, 254 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Ger-
mann]; 1 A. TROLLER, IMMATERIALGUETERRECHT 3.Kapitel, § 8, V., at 2 (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as TROLLER]. For the purview of UWG, see EULAu. supra note 102, at 61 et seq. 
117. /d., II art. 1 lit. e. 
118. Since the conduct of the third person must only be determined or suitable to induce an 
employee to violate his duty, the provision also covers cases where there is no inducing breach of 
contract. 
119. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 68. 
120. [1926] 52 BGE II 380; [1927] 53 BGE II 321. 
121. See Mutzner, Zur Frage der rechtlichen Wirksamkeit von Karlellabreden gegenueber Aussenseilern, 23 
SCHWEIZERISCHE jURISTEN-ZElTUNG [SjZ] 145, 151 (1926-1927); H. OSER & W. 
SCHOENENBERGER, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT, 5 KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
ZIVILGESETZBUCH (A. Egger, A. Escher, R. Haab & H. Oser eds. 1929) [hereinafter cited as 
OSER & SCHOENENBERGER]; A. VON TUHR, ALLEGMEINER TElL DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN OBLIGA-
TIONENRECHTS, I, § 46, II, 1 (2d ed. A. Siegwart 1942); 1 K. OITINGER, SCHWEIZERISCHES 
HAITPFLICHTRECHT: ALLEGMEINER TElL S 4, II (4th ed. 1975); H. MERZ, BERNER KOMMERTAR: 
EINLEITUNG UNDPERSONENRECHT, EINLEITUNGKOMMENTAR ZU ART. 2 ZBG, N.564 (1962); B. 
VON BUEREN, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, ALLEMEINER TElL 53, N.68 (1964); T. 
GUHL, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECHT § 24, I, 2 (6th ed. H. Merz & M. Kummer 
1972) [hereinafter cited as GUHL]; P. ENGEL, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT SUISSE 103 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ENGEL]; M. REHBINDER, GRUNDRISS DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN ARBEIT-
SRECHTS 45 (3d ed. 1975). 
122. OSER & SCHOENENBERGER, supra note 121, Kommentar zu art. 41 OR, para. 16; see also 
jaeggi, Vorbemerkungen vor arl. lOR, para. 68, in 5 W. SCHOENENBERGER & P. jAEGGI, KOMMEN-
TAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCH: OBLIGATIONENRECHT, pI. V(I)(a) (3d ed. F.W. 
Buergi, el al. 1973). 
62 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2, No.1 
criteria of "malice" and "revenge. "125 The means which the third person 
uses for the inducement are usually applied against the Debtor (e.g., threat, 
wilfull deceit and intimidation). If, therefore, the use of such means is 
classified as contra bonos mores or, perhaps, as an unlawful act against the Deb-
tor, it does not automatically follow that the conduct is also a tort against the 
Creditor.m In cases involving an inducement to breach a contract under Arti-
cle 1, I UWG, the commentators have been unable to reach a common solu-
tion. Whereas some apply the reasoning of the Bundesgericht to such cases, 125 
others argue that a claim arises even in the absence of ' 'specific 
circumstances. ' '126 
A. France 
IV. THE UNDERLYING CONCEPTS LEADING TO THE 
DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS 
In France, as mentioned above, the inducer is liable for his conduct under 
Article 1382 of the Civil Code: 
Any act of a person which causes damage to another makes him by 
whose fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation for the 
damage. 127 
The provision is applied to inducing breach of contract only under interpreta-
tions of Article 1165 of the Civil Code: 
Contracts only produce effects between the contracting parties. 
They do not affect third parties and do not benefit them, except in 
the case provided by Article 1121. 128 
This principle reflects a basic rule of the Roman law, inter alios acta vel judicata 
aliis non nocere1 29 and thus pertains only to the effects of contractual ar-
rangements. This means that rights and obligations can only exist between the 
parties to the contractUO and, e contrario, "the existence of a contract and of its 
consequences is a fact which a great number of interested parties must 
respect. "1st This interpretation based on the distinction between internal effect 
of the contract (effet) and the right to invoke it against third persons (opposabilite des 
contrats) has been generally accepted. Thus, the impairment of contracts by 
123. ENGEL, supra note 121, at 103. For further details see EULAU, supra note 102, at 49 et seq. 
124. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 149 et seq. 
125. E.g., Germann, supra note 116, at 309-10. 
126. 2 TROLLER, supra note 116, at 19. Kapitel S 59, 2; EULAU, supra note 102, at 83 et seq. 
127. C. CIV. art. 1382 (Fr.) (A. von Mehren, trans.). 
128. C. CIV. art. 1165 (Fr.) (H. Cachard, trans.). 
129. CODE 7.60. 
130. See P. HUGUENEY, RESPONSABILfI'E CIVILE DU TIERS COMPLICE DE 'LA VIOLATION D'UNE 
OBLIGATION CONTRACTUELLE 204, 214-15 (1910); 1 H. DE PAGE, TRAiTE ELEMENTARIE DE 
DROIT CIVIL BELGE. No. 122, at 131 (1933) [hereinafter cited as DE PAGE]. 
131. DE PAGE, supra note 130 (emphasis added). 
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third parties' conduct must be considered an infringement of the Creditor's 
contractual rights. 132 The application of Article 1382 of the Civil Code which 
protects any kind of assets was made possible. 133 In an analogue to the law of 
property requiring that, for the protection of the owner against third persons, 
he must have possession of the personal property or have registered his owner-
ship of the realty, m it is essential for the opposabilite du contrat that the "out-
. sider," the third person, has knowledge of the existence of the contract. m 
In the Federal Republic of Germany and in Switzerland no provision com-
pares to Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. 
B. Federal Republic of Germany 
The basic German statute on unlawful acts is Section 823 BGB: 
One who, designedly or negligently injures life, body, health, 
freedom, the property or any right of another in an unlawful manner 
is bound to indemnify the other for the injury arising therefrom. 
The same obligation rests upon one who violates a law, the purpose 
of which is to afford protection to another . . . .136 
This provision's first paragraph refers to specific rights (so-called "absolute 
rights' ') which may be asserted generally against everybody who interferes 
with them. The second paragraph classifies conduct as unlawful if it violates 
"special protection laws." As discussed above, Sections 20 Un1 WG and 125 
GeWO are considered "special protection laws" which apply to certain cases 
of inducing breach of contract and which, therefore, make the inducer's act 
unlawful. 
Since Germany does not have a statute explicitly applicable to inducing 
breach of contract in general, some commentators have inquired whether the 
Creditor's claim as such could be deemed an "absolute right" within the 
meaning of Section 823, I BGB, with the consequence that interferences with 
contracts would be unlawful acts against the Creditors. As this section does not 
mention the claim of the Creditor within the enumerated "absolute rights" it 
was attempted to interpret the claim as a so-called "other right."137 
In recent times Koziol, especially, considered the Creditor's claim against 
the Debtor such an "other right." Since the Creditor can demand the per-
132. See R. SAVATIER, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILlTE CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN9AIS: LES 
SOURCES DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE no. 144-45, at 187 el seq. (2d ed. 1951); 1 H. MAZEAUD. L. 
MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAni THEoRIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DELlC-
TUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE, no. 144, at 176 el seq. (5th ed. 1957). 
133. Limpens, De I'opposabilite des con/rats a I'lgard des liers, in MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE 
PAUL ROUBIER, TOME II, at 89,97 el seq. (1961) [hereinafter cited as Limpens]. 
134. With respect to C. CIV. art. 1583, see S III supra. . 
135. See Limpens, supra note 133, at 102 and the explanation and citations in notes 79-88 supra 
and accompanying text. 
136. BGB S 823 (W. Ger.) (W. Loewy, trans.). 
137. After the enumeration of special "absolute rights," S 823, I BGB refers to "any right of 
another." 
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formance of the contract by the Debtor, he has, by the same token, a claim 
"that the Debtor uses his will according to the contractual provisions. "138 
This claim can also be invoked against third persons in the sense that 
everybody must respect the "bound will" of the Debtor. Thus, the (inten-
tional) inducement to breach a contract is, in this opinion, unlawful within the 
meaning of Section 823, I BG B.139 This approach has properly been criticized: 
a Creditor's claim which can be invoked against everybody not to influence 
the Debtor's will to perform the contract is nothing more than a right to that 
will. ao But such a right, as Koziol'+! himself states, contradicts the so-called 
"right of freedom" or the "freedom of the person," and, therefore, violates 
the so-called "personal rights." 
Another commentator focuses on a "general duty" to abstain from interfer-
ing with contractual relations: inducing breach of contract is by nature 
unlawful because it is an "aimed violation of the Creditor's claim." 142 U nfor-
tunately, this commentator does not present a sufficient argument to support 
his statement. 
In connection with the protection of the Creditor from inducing breach of 
contract, no commentator has so far considered the Creditor's claim as pro-
perty, one of the enumerated rights under Section 823, I BGB.14S 
Most of the authors may be reluctant to recognize the Creditor's claim as an 
"absolute right" such as property out of fear of reintroducing and thus 
acknowledging the so-called ius ad rem of the former Prussian Common 
Law.IH 
C. Switzerland 
A similar situation is found in Switzerland. The basic provision on unlawful 
acts is Article 41, I of the Federal Code of Obligations: 
Every person who causes damage to another in an unlawful manner, 
be it wilfully or be it negligently or imprudently, is liable for com-
pensation. as 
In contrast to Section 823 of the German Civil Code, Article 41, lOR does 
neither enumerate specifically protectable rights nor refer to "special protec-
tion laws." Thus, one can learn the range of the application of this provision 
only from its interpretation. But it is undisputed today, in the opinions of the 
courts as well as in the doctrine, that conduct is unlawful if it infringes upon an 
138. KOZIOL, supra note 111, at 156,154-55. 
139. /d. at 163, 185. REHBEIN, supra note 14, at 230 el seq., has a similar point of view. 
140. KRASSER, supra note 86, at 187-88. 
141. Note 111 supra, at 154, 158. 
142. M. LOEWISCH, DER DELIKTSSCHUTZ RELATIVER RECHTE 138 (1970). 
143. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 140-41 (especially 141n.85). 
144. Oertmann, Der Schadensersalzanspruch des obligalorisch Berechligten, in FESTGABE FUER 
HEINRICH DERNBURG 61,81 (1900). 
145. OR I art. 41 (Switz.) (G. Wettstein, trans.). 
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"absolute right" such as property, patents, life, body, health and freedom, or 
"if the conduct contravenes commands or prescriptions of the legal order 
which are promulgated to protect the violated interest." as Thus, in the final 
analysis, the situation in Switzerland is the same as in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. There are some special statutes which explicitly procure the 
Creditor the possibility of a claim against the inducerH7 and which, therefore, 
make the conduct of the third person unlawful. But, as in Germany, it has 
been impossible to prove that the contractual claim of the Creditor can be 
classified as an "absolute right." However, two commentators consider in-
ducement to breach a contract a violation of the Creditor's so-called" personal 
rights" and, therefore, of an "absolute right" but unfortunately neither gives 
sound reasons for this assertion. us Others, too, classify the inducer's conduct 
as unlawful without giving any specific explanations. 149 Moreover, 
Switzerland does not acknowledge the ius ad rem. 
Thus, in Germany and Switzerland, the only remaining possibility is to ap-
ply Section 826 of the German Civil Code or Article 41, II of the Swiss Federal 
Code of Obligations to inducing breach of contract. 150 However, to classify the 
conduct of the inducer as contra bonos mores one must focus on "special cir-
cumstances." Otherwise one would, quasi-indirectly, recognize an "absolute 
right" of the Creditor which would contradict the arguments above. 
The German Bundesgerichtshof does not require "special" circumstances" 
in cases of unfair competition, perhaps because the court acknowledges a kind of 
specific relationship between competitors based on their common interest in 
making profit. But only the interest is common; the way to achieve a profit is 
almost always independent and in conflict. In fact, each competitor seeks to 
maximize his profit, often regardless of the impact his behavior might have on 
others. The danger of abuse of one's economic freedom is, therefore, very 
great. It is the task of the legislature and the courts to set limits on the com-
petitor's conduct to protect and thus to guarantee a public interest in economic 
fairness. From this point of view it must be understood that the Bundes-
gerichtshof maintains a stricter attitude toward liability in cases of inducing 
breach of contract where the inducer and Creditor are competitors. The posi-
146. [1968] 94 BGE I 642-43; see also GUHL, supra note 121, I., 2; 1 K. OITINGER, 
SCHWEIZERISCHES HAITPFLICHTRECHT: ALLEGEMEINER TElL. § 4., II (4th ed. 1975). 
147. See (194:3] UWG I art. 1 lit. e&f(Switz.); StGB art. 162 (Switz.), in connection with OR I 
art. 50 (Switz.). 
148. See C.-P. MERCIER, FAUT-IL ADMETTRE L'EXISTENCE DU JUS AD REM EN DROIT CIVIL 
SUISSE?, at 157 et seq. (1929); A. EGGER, EINLEITUNG UND PERSONENRECHT, 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM 
SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR ZU ART. 28 ZGB, N.69. (2d ed. A. Egger, A. 
Escher, R. Haab & H. Oser 1930). 
149. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 124 et seq. Also Grossen, supra note 80, at 135 and Yung, 
Principes fondJJmentaux et problems actuels de la responsabilite civile en droit suisse, in COLLOGUE FRANCO-
GERMANO-SUISSE SUR LES FONDEMENTS ET LES FONCTIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 93, 123 
(F.-E. Klein ed. 1973), classify the inducer's conduct as unlawful without giving specific explana-
tions. 
150. Insofar as no "special statutes" are applicable, of course. 
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tion of the Swiss Bundesgericht remains uncertain; no cases are known in 
which Article 1, I UWG, has been applied. The author believes, however, that 
it is unnecessary that the Swiss court focuses on "special circumstances" to 
classify inducing breach of contract as an act of unfair competition. 151 
D. United States 
In the United States, the commentators generally consider the Creditor's 
claim against the Debtor as a right cognate to property which is protected within 
limits from interferences by third parties. This result is seen as "the practical ef-
fect of the Lumley v. Gye doctrine [which] is the creation of a new right, running 
against the world." 152 Thus, this right has been defined as a right in rem. 153 The 
opinion of Chief Justice Gaines must be understood in this sense: 
It seems to us that, where a party has entered into a contract with 
another to do or not to do a particular act or acts, he has a clear right 
to its performance as he has to his property, either real or personal; 
and that knowingly to induce the other party to violate it is as 
distinct a wrong as it is to injure or destroy his property. m 
Moreover, the case of Lumley v. Gye may also be seen as the threshold for the 
subsequent development that has, in some sense, extended the doctrine on in-
ducing breach of a contract "to interference with advantageous economic rela-
tions even where they have not been cemented by contract. "155 The concept 
that the Creditor's claim against the Debtor is classified as a right cognate to 
property has its roots in the subordination of contract to the law of property. 
This lasted until 1790 when the first recognition of expectation damages ap-
peared and formed the "cornerstone" for the will theory of contract. 156 
V. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, to answer the question as to 
whether the inducer can be sued successfully by the Creditor of the contract, it 
is necessary to start from the principle of "privity of contract." This means 
151. See EULAU, supra note 102, at 83 et seq. 
152. Sayre, supra note 3, at 676 n.45. 
153. !d.; see also PROSSER, supra note 5, at 930-31; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 497-98; 
Carpenter, supra note 48, at 733 (and citations therein). Compare Draft 14, supra note 3, § 766: 
.. [T]here is a general duty not to interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expec-
tancies of trade with third persons, whether or not they are secured by contract ... " [d. (em-
phasis added). 
154. Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 72 S.W. 580, 73 S.W. 800 (1903); see also S.C. 
Posner Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 119 N.E. 573 (1918); Goldman v. Harford Road 
Bldg. Ass'n., 150 Md. 677, 133 A. 843 (1926); Carolina Overall Corp. v. East Carolina Linen 
Supply, Inc., 8 N.C. App. 528, 174 S.E.2d 659 (1970). In Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 
Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927), Chief Justice Wilson states: "When one has knowledge of the 
contract rights of another, his wrongful inducement of a breach thereof is a willful destruction of 
the property of another." !d. at 266,214 N.W. at 756. 
155. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 931. 
156. See M. J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160 et seq. 
(1977). 
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that only the Creditor can demand the accomplishment of his claim and only 
the Debtor can be forced to fulfill his duty. In addition, one must consider the 
third person's interest in keeping his freedom of individual action, a part of 
which is freedom of contract in the sense of freedom to enter into contracts and 
to choose his contractual partner. On one side is the Creditor's interest in the 
integrity of his contractual relationship with the Debtor which may involve 
commercial expectancies. On the other side is the third person's interest in 
free action. One must determine when and to what extent one interest is to be 
sacrificed to the benefit of the other. Thus, the extent to which each interest is 
protected by the law vis-a-vis the other is the result of a weighing and balanc-
ing process. From this process may depend decisively the legitimacy of holding 
the inducer responsible and liable. 
The United States and France strongly emphasize the protection of the con-
tractual relationship, and, therefore, of the Creditor's claim from interference 
by third persons. Both countries generally classify inducing breach of contract 
as unlawful if the inducer acted intentionally. While American courts focus on 
a right of the Creditor cognate to property, the French decisions are based on 
the rule of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. 
Neither the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany nor those of 
Switzerland recognize a general protection for contractual rights as such. 
These rights are protected only within the limits of Section 826 of the German 
Civil Code and Article 41, II ofthe Swiss Federal Code of Obligations. Both of 
these provisions focus on damages caused by conduct contra bono mores. To ap-
ply Section 826 BGB and Article 41, II OR, to cases of inducing breach of 
contract, "special circumstances" are generally required as part of the in-
ducer's conduct. However, there are some tendencies which try to classify the 
third person's conduct as unlawful in the sense of Section 823 BGB and Article 
41, lOR. 
In contrast to the United States and France, Germany and Switzerland 
have particular statutes on unfair competition. As far as such special provi-
sions apply to the inducer's conduct, the German Bundesgerichtshof generally 
does not require "special circumstances" to hold the third person liable. The 
Swiss Bundesgericht has not so far had the opportunity to decide a case of in-
ducing breach of contract to which the Statute on Unfair Competition was ap-
plicable. While the German law classifies any act of unfair competition as con-
tra bonos mores, in Switzerland such acts are considered unlawful. In addition, 
there are some other special statutes of minor importance which in France, 
Germany and Switzerland may apply to inducing breach of contract. 
The question remains whether the third person's interest in freedom of ac-
tion is more restricted, to the benefit of the Creditor's interest in the integrity 
of his contractual relationship, where no "special circumstances" are required 
to classify inducing breach of contract as unlawful or as contra bono mores. If the 
answer is affirmative, we must decide if this result is justified. 
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If the Creditor and the inducer are competitors, and as long as the contract 
between Creditor and Debtor is valid, especially with regard to antitrust law, 
the opinions of the different courts are more or less the same, with the excep-
tion noted above of Switzerland. That is, "special circumstances" are not re-
quired. The third person's interest is obviously less important than the interest 
of the Creditor. The specific situation or relationship between competitors in 
and of itself demands a strong protection from abuse of one's position that 
could easily lead to elimination of the competition. In the author's opinion, it 
is well justified to apply a stringent standard to the third person's conduct. 
Where, as in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Switzerland, the 
classification of the inducer's conduct as contra bonos mores is based on "special 
circumstances," inducing breach of contract has no independent significance. 
Thus, the interest of the third person in freedom of action is no more limited 
than in other cases of human conduct considered contra bonos mores. 
The courts in the United States do not focus on "special circumstances," in 
contrast to France, even in cases of multiple sales of real estate. The great 
number and especially the nature of privileges recognized in American law as 
defenses to liability of the inducer lessen the drastic impact on the third per-
son's freedom to enter into contracts and on his right of free action. One may 
say that inducing breach of contract is unlawful as far as "special cir-
cumstances" or "situations" (and there are a great number of these) do not 
justify the inducer's conduct. Under this standard, the effect of the solution in 
the United States does not differ much from the effect of the solutions in Ger-
many and Switzerland, even though the approach is quite different. 
